现代企业组织制度中的委托—代理关系

The Principal-agent Relations in Organization Institution of Modern Enterprises

现代企业组织制度中存在一系列委托—代理关系 ,基于所有权和经营权相分离的委托—代理制既是必要的、有效的 ,又存在着委托人和代理人的效用函数不同的矛盾。西方管理学家对委托人目标和代理人效用函数的不一致性进行了研究 ,提出了委托—代理理论。简要介绍了这一理论 ,并从建立健全激励—约束机制、实行目标管理、培育企业文化和建设规范运行的市场 4个方面 ,论述了建立健全激励—约束 。

There are a series of principal agent relations in organization institution of modern enterprises. The principal agent mechanism based on separating of proprietary rights and management rights is not only necessary and effective, but also there is contradictory of difference between utility of functions of principal and agent. West management scientists have researched on the difference between utility functions of principal and agent. They suggested the theory of principal agent. A brief introduction to the theory is given. The construction of healthy encouragement constraint mechanism and the ways to improve principal agent relations through assessing and rewarding/punishing to agent, implementing objective management, cultivating enterprise culture, and constructing normal running market are discussed.