基于监督与惩罚的食品供应链突发事件治理研究

Study on Food Supply Chain Emergency Governance Based on Supervision and Penalty

构建以食品供应链内核心企业为主导、其他成员企业为从属关系的监管博弈模型,分析核心企业所实施的惩罚力度和发现概率两种监管手段对防范供应链成员非诚信行为的作用,并对两种监管手段的效果进行比较分析。

In this paper we established a food supply chain supervision game model with the core enterprise of the supply chain as the leader and other member enterprises as followers,analyzed the effect of the supervisory means based on penalty and discovery respectively upon preventing dishonesty of supply chain members and compared the performance of the two means.