摘要
财政联邦主义理论告诉我们,地方财政行为可能会影响环境政策的执行,在财政分权的情况下,可能出现地方政府为了促进经济增长和增加税收收入而采取放松环境质量管理的策略行为,导致"竞争到底"现象的出现。基于这一理论假设,从地方政府的角度,建立计量经济模型对我国现行环境税费的环保效果进行实证检验,得出如下结论:我国应积极推行绿色GDP等考核指标;明晰中央政府和地方政府各自的环保责任;中央政府应规范地方政府之间的竞争,等等。
Fiscal federalism theory tells us that the local fiscal behavior may influence the implementation of envi- ronmental policies. Under the condition of fiscal decentralization, local governments pay less attention to the en- viromnental quality management in order to promote economic growth and to increase tax revenue, resulting in the phenomenon of competition in the end. Based on this theory hypothesis, from the perspective of local govern- ments, an empirical test is carried out on the environmental effect of China' s current environmental tax by estab- lishing an econometric model. The result shows that China should actively implement green GDP assessment indi- cators. And the responsibilities of local governments and central government should be made clear. Meanwhile, the central government should regulate the competition among the local governments.
出处
《税务与经济》
CSSCI
北大核心
2012年第5期86-92,共7页
Taxation and Economy
基金
福建省科技厅重点项目"建设资源节约型和环境友好型社会的环境税制度设计研究"(项目编号:2009R0077)
厦门市科技局软科学战略与决策研究项目"建设厦门环境友好型城市的财税政策研究"(项目编号:3502Z20095010)的支持
为其阶段性研究成果之一
关键词
中国
环境税费
环保效果
地方政府
China
environmental tax
environmental effect
local government