期刊文献+

水利工程建设施工供应链质量控制博弈研究 被引量:4

Research on Quality Control Game Problem of Water Conservancy Project Construction Supply Chain
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摘要 研究了水利工程建设总承包商和分包商组成的施工供应链中合作双方的质量控制博弈问题,建立了水利工程施工供应链质量收益模型,基于不完全信息下总承包商以质量监督效力和质量保证金作为控制手段、分包商以施工质量保证水平为控制措施的博弈过程,构造了质量保证水平与质量保证金扣除额度之间的指数函数关系,并运用最优控制理论寻求双方的质量博弈策略。实例应用结果表明,该质量保证金扣除方式科学合理、博弈策略有助于优化水利工程建设质量。 This paper studies quality control game problem of water conservancy construction supply chain composed by the contractor and subcontractor. Under incomplete information environment, quality supervision effectiveness and quality guarantee fund as contractor's control means, quality guarantee level as subcontractor's control measure, this paper builds an index function relationship between quality guarantee level and the deduction amount of quality guarantee fund, and establishes the quality income model. And then the optimal control theory is used to find the strategy of quality game. Example results show that the method of quality guarantee fund deduction amount is scientific and reasonable, and the quality game theory is helpful to optimize construction quality of water conservancy.
出处 《水电能源科学》 北大核心 2012年第9期115-118,共4页 Water Resources and Power
基金 华北水利水电学院研究生创新课题基金资助项目(YK2011-01)
关键词 水利工程 施工供应链 质量 博弈 water eonservancyl construction supply chain quality game
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参考文献5

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二级参考文献26

  • 1王恩军.实行监理制后业主如何主动性降低工程质量风险[J].中国建材科技,2005,14(1):38-39. 被引量:2
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