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供应链道德风险的演化规律 被引量:9

Evolution law of moral hazards in supply chains
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摘要 建立了以人为粒度(agent)的供应链道德风险有向多局域世界网络模型,给出了供应链道德风险的定义,确定了供应链道德风险复杂网络中人与人之间相互作用的交互规则及网络的演化规则,采用复杂网络分析方法,证明了供应链道德风险复杂网络拓扑特性的演化规律——其网络服从幂律分布,供应链道德风险多局域世界复杂网络满足无标度特性,该幂律取决于供应链特性的大小. A multi-local-world directed networks model based on persons' interacting rules is given, the moral hazards in supply chains are defined, and the evolution law of topological features of the moral hazards in sup- ply chain is given. So, the interactive rules between agents in this complex networks are quantified. The evo- lution law of the topological structure' s character, is proven to conform to power-law distribution. The result shows that multi-local-worlds of moral hazards in supply chain must be a scale-free, with the component being decided by the character of the supply chain.
出处 《管理科学学报》 CSSCI 北大核心 2012年第8期1-11,共11页 Journal of Management Sciences in China
基金 国家自然科学基金资助项目(70771083 71040001)
关键词 供应链 道德风险 有向多局域世界复杂网络 幂律分布 supply chain moral hazards multi-local-world directed networks power-law distribution
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参考文献19

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二级参考文献15

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