摘要
本文研究管理层对股权激励行权条件的操纵行为。行权条件由考核指标与目标水平组成。结果表明,大部分企业采用2个考核指标,目标水平低于分析师预期18.99%。进一步,国有企业的考核指标个数高于民营企业,但是目标水平低于民营企业。这是由于法规对国有企业的考核指标个数作出严格规定,但是其管理层通过操纵目标水平,仍然能够获得门槛较低的行权条件。最后,行权条件被操纵带来负面的经济后果,短期股东财富降低2.06%,9、24个月的长期股东财富(BHAR)分别降低16.51%、38.11%。
This paper investigates the managers＇ manipulation on exercise condition, which is comprised of evaluation indexes and target level. Most firms adopt two evaluation indexes and target level is lower than analyst consensus by 18.99 %. Furthermore, state-owned enterprises adopt more indexes than private-owned enterprises, but their target level is lower than private-owned enterprises. It is because the regulation for the number of indexes in SOE is stricter than POE, but the managers still gain low level exercise condition by manipulating target level. Finally, the manipulated exercise condition leads to negative economic consequence, by decreasing 2 days, 24 months and 36 months shareholder wealth for 2.06%, 16.51%, and 38.11% respectively.
出处
《现代财经（天津财经大学学报）》
CSSCI
北大核心
2012年第9期95-105,共11页
Modern Finance and Economics：Journal of Tianjin University of Finance and Economics
关键词
考核指标
目标水平
管理层权力
股东财富
evaluation index
target level
managerial power
shareholder wealth
