摘要
本文从中央政府与地方政府行为角度构建了中国式分权与宏观经济绩效之间的关联框架,指出中国式分权体制下的地方政府竞争行为构成了中国经济增长以及周期性过热的主导力量。由于中国不同省份的自然历史、地理位置以及发展政策差异极大,即使是同样的分权程度也可能产生不同的经济绩效与激励效果,这也就使得面板数据模型回归结论对其设定形式非常敏感。因此,本文采用受限VAR模型来实证分析中国式财政分权对于经济增长率和通货膨胀率的作用效应,结论证实了本文的理论预期。
From the behaviors of China's central government and local governments, this paper constructed the relevance frame between China's fiscal decentralization and its macro-economic performance, and indicated that the competitive behaviors of local governments under China's fiscal decentralization system formed the leading force of overheated economic growth and periodicity. Because of the great differences in the natural history, geographical location and development policies of different provinces, even the same decentralization degree would produce different economic performance and incentive effect, which made the regression conclusions of panel data model were sensitive to the set forms. Therefore, this paper gave an empirical analysis to the effects of China's fiscal decentralization on economic growth rate and inflation rate with confined VAR model, and the conclusions proved the theoretical expectation of the paper.
出处
《浙江社会科学》
CSSCI
北大核心
2012年第9期11-19,41,共10页
Zhejiang Social Sciences
基金
2012年国家社会科学基金青年项目(12CJL060)
2011年教育部人文社会科学研究青年基金项目(11YJC790190)
2012年教育部人文社会科学研究规划基金项目(12YJA790165)
2011年江西省社会科学"十二五"规划项目(11JL04与11JL09)
关键词
财政分权
经济增长
经济波动
受限VAR模型
Fiscal Decentralization, Economic Growth, Economic Fluctuation, Confined VAR Model