产业集群中的可信承诺及治理--基于非对称核心企业与配套企业关系资本视角的研究

Credible Commitment and Governance in the Industrial Cluster: Based on the Relationship Capital Between Asymmetric Core Enterprises and Supporting Enterprises

本文基于产业集群中非对称核心企业与配套企业关系资本视角就关系资本如何维持核心企业与配套企业可信承诺进行了理论研究。研究认为,关系资本投入的增加显然会有效提升核心企业(配套企业)承诺的可信程度,是维持承诺可信的有效机制;进一步地,关系资本的投入与背弃承诺的赔偿金水平存在一定的"替代效应",两者共同维持了核心企业与配套企业之间承诺的可信。基于此,本文提出了以市场治理、关系治理与科层治理三维(经济纬度、社会纬度、行政纬度)互补架构形式的核心企业和配套企业承诺可信治理体系。

Based on the relationship capital between asymmetric core enterprises and supporting enterprises in the industry cluster, the paper made theoretical researches on how to maintain the credible commitment of core enterprises and supporting enterprises. The results show that the increase of capital investment will effectively enhance the commitment confidence of core enterprises (supporting enterprises), which is the effective mechanism to maintain commitment confidence. Furthermore, there is 'substitution effect' between the relationship capital investment and the compensation level of breaking a promise, both of which can maintain the commitment confidence between core enterprises and supporting enterprises. Based on this, this paper provided the commitment confidence governance system for core enterprises and supporting enterprises in the 3D complementary form of market management, relationship management and hierarchical governance.