政府控制、企业并购及其绩效--来自中国证券市场的经验证据

Goyernment Control and Enterprises' Mergers & Acquisitions——Evidence from the Chinese Securities Market

国有股权对公司业绩的影响问题,是中国推进国有企业改革过程中必须予以回答的重要问题。本文从企业并购的角度,研究了国有股权对企业行为及其经济后果的影响。研究结果显示,国有企业比民营企业更可能并购国有企业;并购双方都是国有企业时,并购后并购企业的业绩不仅显著下降,并且显著差于其他情况下并购企业的业绩。以上结果表明,国有股权影响了企业的并购行为,并导致并购企业业绩的下降。本文的研究不仅深化了国有股权治理效应和企业并购方面的研究,而且其研究结论在一定程度上解释了中国国有企业经营效率低下的原因,为中国国有企业市场化改革提供了依据。

During the reform of SOEs, one of the important problems is the influence of state ownership on SOEs＇ performances. From the perspective of enterprises＇ mergers and acquisitions, we studied the influence of state ownership on enterprises＇ behaviors and economic consequences. The result indicates that comparing to private enterprises, SOEs are more possibly to merge SOEs. When the mutual sides of the mergers and acquisitions are both SOEs, after the mergers and acquisitions ,the mergers＇ performances not only declined significantly, but also worse significantly than others. These results show that state ownership affect enterprises＇ mergers and acquisitions behaviors, and lead the performance of mergers to fall down after the mergers and acquisitions. Our findings not only enriches the researches about governance effects of the State ownership and Enterprises＇ Mergers ＆ Acquisitions,its conclusions also explain the reason why SOEs＇ operating effi- eiency are low and provide a reference for the reform of SOEs