期刊文献+

损失厌恶下带有风险约束的委托投资组合模型 被引量:10

Delegated portfolio models with a risk constrain under loss aversion
下载PDF
导出
摘要 在管理者呈损失厌恶的假设下,构建了带有风险约束的委托投资组合模型,研究委托投资管理中的最优投资问题.通过构造辅助函数将以条件风险价值为约束的委托投资组合问题转化为约束含有随机凸函数的随机优化问题,证明了最优策略的存在性.进而利用随机抽样方法构造了Monte Carlo罚函数算法,得到了近似最优投资策略,并证明了当样本容量足够大时近似最优投资策略几乎处处是原委托投资组合问题的最优策略.最后,给出了数值算例说明模型的有效性和管理者的损失厌恶对最优策略的影响. Suppose that the manager is loss adverse the delegated portfolio model with a risk constraint is established in order to research the optimal investment problem in the delegated portfolio management. The delegated portfolio problem with the conditional value at risk as a constraint is transformed into a stochastic optimization with a stochastic convex function as a constraint by constructing the auxiliary function, and the existence of the optimal strategies is proved. Furthermore, the approximation optimal investment strategies are obtained based on the Monte Carlo penalty function algorithm constructed by using the random sampling method and are proved, to be almost everywhere the optimal strategies of the original delegated portfolio problem when the sample number is larger enough. Finally, the numerical examples are given to illustrate the effectiveness of the model and the effect of loss aversion of the manager on the optimal portfolio strategies.
出处 《系统工程学报》 CSCD 北大核心 2012年第4期513-519,共7页 Journal of Systems Engineering
基金 国家自然科学基金资助项目(71001015 11061011 71101033) 高等学校博士学科点专项科研基金资助项目(20090041110009) 中央高校基本科研业务费专项资金资助项目(DUT10ZD107 DUT1 1RW202) 大连理工大学人文社会科学研究基金资助项目(DUTHS2008203) 桂林电子科技大学博士启动资助项目(GLEU201068 UF11013Y)
关键词 损失厌恶 CVAR 委托投资组合 MONTE CARLO模拟 随机优化 loss aversion CVaR delegated portfolio Monte Carlo simulation stochastic optimization
  • 相关文献

参考文献21

  • 1Bhattacharya S, Pfleiderer R Delegated portfolio management[J]. Journal of Economic Theory, 1985, 36(1): 1-25.
  • 2Stoughton N M. Moral hazard and the portfolio management problem[J]. Journal of Finance, 1993, 48(5): 2009-2028.
  • 3Admati A, Pfleiderer E Does it all add up? Benchmark and the compensation of active portfolio managers[J]. Journal of Business, 1996, 70(3): 323-350.
  • 4Ou-Yang H. Optimal contracts in a continuous-time delegated portfolio management problem[J]. Review of Financial Studies, 2003, 16(1): 173-208.
  • 5刘京军,梁建峰.道德风险下的最优委托理财契约研究[J].系统工程学报,2009,24(5):602-606. 被引量:4
  • 6Starks L T. Performance incentive fees: An agency theoretic approach[J]. Journal of Financial and Quantitative, 1987, 22(1): 17-32.
  • 7Cohen S, Starks L T. Estimation risk and incentive contracts for portfolio managers[J]. Management Science, 1988, 34(9): 1067- 1079.
  • 8Golec H J. Empirical tests of a principal-agent model of the investor-investment advisor relationship[J]. Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis, 1992, 22(1): 17-32.
  • 9Nanda V, Narayanan M P, Warther A V. Liquidity, investment ability and mutual fund structure[J]. Journal of Financial Economics, 2000, 57(2): 417-443.
  • 10Alexandre M B. Optimal delegated portfolio management with background risk[J]. Journal of Banking and Finance, 2008, 32(3): 977-985.

二级参考文献30

共引文献33

同被引文献107

引证文献10

二级引证文献46

相关作者

内容加载中请稍等...

相关机构

内容加载中请稍等...

相关主题

内容加载中请稍等...

浏览历史

内容加载中请稍等...
;
使用帮助 返回顶部