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排污权初始分配拍卖模型研究 被引量:5

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摘要 排污权交易是近年来备受各国关注的一项旨在保护环境的经济政策,其初始分配模式通过改变市场结构影响企业行为和企业绩效,进而影响经济运行效率。拍卖模型作为一种初始分配模式,在总量控制的前提下,通过排污权的市场交易,实现低成本控制污染。相对于政府行政管制手段较多的免费分配模型,拍卖模型充分地运用了排污权资源配置方面的优势。本文通过追溯国内外排污权初始分配的研究,明确拍卖模型中的企业最优报价策略。在此基础上,结合我国实际,分析交易主体的成本收益,最后提出对这一问题的今后研究方向。
出处 《财经问题研究》 CSSCI 北大核心 2012年第10期25-30,共6页 Research On Financial and Economic Issues
基金 辽宁省社会科学规划基金项目"排污权交易中的环境容量与有偿定价机理--基于辽宁数据的实证研究"(L10DJY035)
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共引文献140

同被引文献71

  • 1陈德湖,李寿德,蒋馥.寡头垄断和排污权初始分配[J].系统工程,2004,22(10):51-53. 被引量:32
  • 2李如忠,汪家权,钱家忠.区域水污染负荷分配的Delphi-AHP法[J].哈尔滨工业大学学报,2005,37(1):84-88. 被引量:38
  • 3沈满洪,赵丽秋.排污权价格决定的理论探讨[J].浙江社会科学,2005(2):26-30. 被引量:20
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