博弈视角下我国铁矿石进口价格谈判的长短期均衡

Short-run and Long-run Equilibrium on Iron Ore Price Negotiations: Based on Game Theory

目前,我国钢铁行业出现了产能过剩和较高的库存,铁矿石现货价格下跌,这一现象是经济发展周期的客观表象,还是三大矿商瓦解中钢协"统一战线"的一个营销策略。本文分别从短期和长期两个角度对这一问题做出分析,以博弈论为工具建立新的理论模型和研究框架,所得结论显示:在短期内我国钢铁行业集中度较低的情况下,钢企之间的博弈结果是"囚徒困境"均衡,这在一定程度上解释了我国铁矿石进口价格"逢谈必涨"的迷局,铁矿石进口价格短期下跌是矿商营销策略的可能性较大;而在长期内我国钢铁行业集中度较高的前提下,铁矿石价格下跌是钢铁行业发展周期的客观趋势。根据博弈结果,寻找我国钢企在短期内摆脱铁矿石价格谈判困境的方法和措施,以及如何在铁矿石价格谈判的长期博弈中抢占先机,做到未雨绸缪,提出一些前瞻性的观点和建议。

The current overcapacity and high inventory in Chinese steel industry together with the decline in spot ore prices present a puzzle. The question is significant about whether this puzzle can be attributed to the business cycle or the big-three miners＇ marketing strategy of disrupting the CISA Union. Based on new game models, this paper investigates this puzzle from both long-run and short-run perspectives and obtains some interesting results. In the short-run, due to its low concentration Chinese steel industry is in prisoner＇s dilemma equilibrium, which to some extent can well explain why iron ore import price always increases along with negotiations. The short-term decline in iron ore import price can largely be attributed to the marketing strategy of big-three miners. In the long-run, conditioned on high concentration the decline in iron ore price is an objective result of the steel industry development cycle. Based on our analysis, we present some proposals and suggestions to help Chinese iron and steel companies escape from the ＂prisoner＇ s dilemma＂ in the short-run and take the lead in iron ore price negotiations in the long-run.