知识外包提供商选择的信号博弈分析——以国内威客网知识流程外包模式为例

Analysis of Signaling Game on Providers' Selection of Knowledge Process Outsourcing: Taking Knowledge Process Outsourcing Patterns of Domestic Witkey Network for Example

知识外包市场具有高风险性、非标准化、高投入、易受外部技术环境影响的特点,为最大限度地规避提供商的违约风险,发包商有必要在合同签订前选择合适的提供商。然而,逆向选择问题使得发包商必须重视观测信号来区别提供商的诚信水平。构建了单一信号传递和双重信号传递的知识外包提供商选择模型,分析了混同均衡、分离均衡、准分离均衡等三种精炼贝叶斯均衡。研究发现,双重信号传递不存在混同均衡,意味着信号空间的增加提高了发包商对提供商的观测能力。最后,以国内威客网的三种知识流程外包模式为例,验证了模型的科学性。

Knowledge process outsourcing market had the characteristics of high-risk, non-standardized, high invest- ment, easily influenced by external technical environment, in order to maximize avoiding the providers＇ default risk, it was necessary for outsourcers to select the appropriate providers before signing the contracts. However, ad- verse selection problems made outsourcers must pay attention to observe signal to differentiate credibility level of providers. This paper had built knowledge process outsourcing providers selected models of single signal transmis- sion and dual signals transmission, analyzed three kinds of perfect Bayesian equilibrium, which were pooling equi- librium, separating equilibrium, and semi-separating equilibrium. Study found that pooling equilibrium not exist in dual signals transmission, it meant that increase of signal space improved outsourcers＇ ability to observe providers. Lastly, took three kinds of knowledge process outsourcing patterns in domestic Witkey network for example, veri- fied the scientific nature of the models.