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民主政治决策之博弈分析——以美国立宪选择为切入点

The Game of Democratic Decision-Making Based on the US Constitutional Options
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摘要 民主政治决策可以模制为一般性政治决策所包含的两阶段式的复杂博弈。如果通过博弈分析方法集中讨论麦迪逊式民主,即在政府各部门之间就有关解释宪法之意涵发生冲突时立法至上,那么就能真实地诠释美国民主之真谛。当然,主题研究更可能的目的在于,运用两阶段式博弈理论为公民和政府决策执行者诠释宪法提供更为有效的方法。 In the United States, constttutional democracy can be modeled as a complex game mvolvlng two general stages of political decision making. But the larger purpose of this paper has been to suggest that the two-stage gametheoretic framework can be a useful tool for citizens and constitutional designers in case of interpreting and practicing the constitutional democracy.
作者 青维富
出处 《四川大学学报(哲学社会科学版)》 CSSCI 北大核心 2012年第4期91-98,共8页 Journal of Sichuan University:Philosophy and Social Science Edition
基金 西华师范大学科研启动基金(09B008)
关键词 政治民主 民主决策 博弈理论 共和政体 political democracy, democratic decisions-making, Theory of Games, republic
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参考文献17

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