金融集团内的信息流动对基金投资业绩的影响

The Impact of Information Flow within Financial Conglomerates upon Fund Investment Performance

金融集团内不同业务部门间的信息流动具有重要经济后果。通过分析金融集团内附属贷款银行的借贷交易如何影响附属基金投资组合调整及其投资业绩,发现在附属贷款银行借贷交易发生期间,受一方控股的附属基金对借款公司股票的增持显著大于控制基金,且这些附属基金所增持的借款公司股票业绩显著高于其同期所持有的同行业非借款公司的股票业绩,对于受多方控股的附属基金没有类似的结论,表明受多方控股的股权结构可能是有效限制附属基金与金融集团内附属贷款银行发生信息流动的防火墙。

The information flow between different business departments has essential economic consequence within financial conglomerates. Through an analysis on how the lending deals of affiliated lending banks within the same financial group affect the portfolio allocation and portfolio performance of the affiliated funds, this paper finds that affiliated funds controlled by one share- holder increase their stock holdings in firms borrowing from these banks around the initiation of the deal more significantly than their control funds. The borrowing stocks in which the affiliated funds increase their holdings out-perform other non-borrowing stocks in the same industry being held by these funds at the same time. However, for the affiliated funds controlled by more shareholders, it is not the same case. This shows that the equity structure controlled by more shareholders may be a firewall which effectively restricts the information flow between affiliated funds and affiliated lending banks within the financial conglomerate.