上市公司股票期权激励与公司风险的实证研究

An Empirical Study on the Relationship between Stock Options Compensation and Risk of Chinese A-share Listed Companies

利用我国A股上市公司2006～2009年的数据,对上市公司高管人员的股票期权激励与公司投资风险和经营风险之间的关系进行实证研究,并通过引入股票期权的Vega分析未来股价波动对公司高管人员股票期权收益等的影响.结果表明:股票期权激励与公司的投资风险、经营风险存在显著的双向正相关关系;股价的波动性将增加高管人员股票期权的收益,减轻管理者对风险的厌恶感,从而增加公司的投资风险与经营风险.

Using the sample of Chinese A-share listed companies from 2006 to 2009, we make an empirical study on the relationship between managerial stock options compensation, investment risk and operating risk. We find that managerial stock options compensation, investment risk and operating risk have notably positive effects on each other. By introducing the concept of Vega, we indicate that the stock price volatility will increase the value of executives＇ stock options, and reduce their risk aversion; thereby they will increase the company＇s investment risk and operating risk. By controlling other factors and endogenous, we empirically prove the conclusion.