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我国国有建设工程监理服务的独立性分析 被引量:6

China's State-owned Construction Project Supervision Service Independence Analysis
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摘要 在现阶段,国有建设工程业主代表与建设监理人的地位并不是平等的。社会责任与契约责任的偏离客观上造成监理人权利与责任的失衡,建设监理人存在丧失独立工作的可能。而监理人声誉机制与申述机制的缺乏会将建设监理人独立判断与决策受到国有建设业主代表的不规范行为干预的可能变为现实。平衡建设监理人权利与责任,促进监理行业协会的建设,强化建设监理人自身素质提高监理人独立性的有效途径。因此,从制度层面理顺监理人权利与责任的关系,保证监理人正当行驶权利,对于促进建设监理人的权利与义务的平衡,对于遏制国有建设业主代表的机会主义行为,摆脱国有建设业主代表对工程建设的非法干预,乃至提高国有建设工程效果具有重要的意义。 At present, the status between the project representative of the state-owned construction and construction supervision people is on the base of equality. The deviation of social responsibility from the contract responsibility has caused imbalance of the rights and responsibilities, and the independent work of the construction supervisor may be lost. And a lack of supervisor's reputation and claim will turn the intervention from he owner's representative of the state-owned construction into a reality. To balance the right and re- sponsibility of construction supervisor and promote the construction of the supervision industry association will turn out to be an effective way of independence. Therefore, from an angle of an institution, the smooth relationship between the rights and responsibilities will en- sure the legal fight of supervisor. There possesses great significance to promote the balance between fights and obligations, curb the op- portunism behavior of owner's representative in state-owned construction, and get rid of the illegal intervention from the representative of state-owned construction, which eventually improve the engineering effect of state-owned construction.
出处 《技术经济与管理研究》 2012年第10期17-20,共4页 Journal of Technical Economics & Management
基金 2010年湖南省社科评审委基金课题1011252B立项资助项目 2010年湖南省省情咨询课题
关键词 监理服务 权利与责任 工程建设 建设监理 Supervision service Right and responsibility Engineering construction Construction supervision
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