摘要
运用信号传递理论,分析了不同类型的卖家发送不同类型的保障标记信号的均衡:当传递信号成本无差异时,不同类型的卖家混同于不发送信号的精炼贝叶斯均衡;只有传递信号成本在不同类型的卖家之间有差异时,才会产生唯一的分离均衡,即高质量卖家选择发送信号,低质量卖家不发送信号,卖家的类型显示能够有效地解决网络交易中的信息不对称问题。
Equilibriums of different sellers transferring different signals are studied based on signaling model. There is a pooling Perfect Bayesian Equilibrium（ PBE）when different sellers have the same cost of transferring signals. When the cost of transferring the signals has difference between the different types of sellers, the separating equilibrium exists. The differ-ent types of sellers help to solve the problems of asymmetric information.
出处
《软科学》
CSSCI
北大核心
2012年第9期60-65,共6页
Soft Science
基金
国家社会科学基金资助项目(08BJY086)
