摘要
地方政府行为依赖于所面临的激励与约束机制。地方政府竞争成为我国经济增长进程中的常态,这源于我国独特的政府分权制度。在财政激励下,地方政府通过对各要素采取非均衡的产权保护方式为增长而竞争。这种竞争模式过度保护了资本要素,而忽视甚至侵害了劳动力、土地等要素。因此,地方政府竞争在促进我国经济高增长的同时,也付出了极高的代价。在缺乏公众等主体的约束下,政府分权带来激励偏差会加大,该发展模式将受到很大的挑战。
The behavior of local governments depends on the mechanisms of incentive and restraint. Competition between local governments becomes the norm in the process of China' s economic growth, which stems from our unique system of governmental decentralization. Facing the financial in- eentivea, the local government competes for growth through non - balaneod property fights protection of the various elements. This mode of competi- tion makes the local government protect capital too much, while ignoring or even destroying the labor, land and other factors. Thus, competition between local governments promotes China' s economic growth, meanwhile pays a high price. In the absence of the public and other constraints, the incentive bias will increase brought by governmental decentralization, , and this mode of development will face a great challenge.
出处
《哈尔滨商业大学学报(社会科学版)》
CSSCI
2012年第5期56-62,共7页
Journal of Harbin University of Commerce:Social Science Edition
基金
教育部人文社科重点研究基地项目(2010CIB01)
关键词
地方政府竞争
政府分权
激励机制
发展模式
Competition between local governments
governmental decentralization
incentive mechanism
mode of development