力量的欲望——论斯宾诺莎哲学中欲望的本质及其特性

The Desire of Power: On the Essence of Desire and Its Proprieties in Spinoza's Philosophy

在斯宾诺莎哲学中,欲望是一个十分重要的概念,但是在传统哲学史研究的语境下,这个概念却时常被忽视,而我们对斯宾诺莎的人类学、伦理学和政治学的理解之所以无法深入,在很大程度上也正根源于此。虽然欲望并不是斯宾诺莎哲学的最终根基,但却是他构建自己的哲学体系并在他的本体论和伦理学之间建立有机关联的关键环节,他的伦理学的创新之处也必须参照欲望概念才能得到清晰的展现。而其中最重要的方面就在于斯宾诺莎为欲望所赋予的新的本质和特性,例如,欲望不再以缺乏作为自身的根本规定,而是成为了力量的表现;欲望不再以善恶作为自身的评价标准,而是超善恶的。从这些方面出发,我们有望对斯宾诺莎的伦理学,甚至对斯宾诺莎的整个哲学体系构建新的思想形象。

＂Desire＂ is an important concept in Spinoza’s philosophy.But in the traditional research of the history of philosophy,it always has been neglected.To some degree,the reason why we were not able to thoroughly grasp the anthropology,ethics,and politics of Spinoza lies in this situation.Not being the ultimate ground of Spinoza’s philosophy,desire is a crucial moment in the constitution of his system and the establishment of the organic relation between his own ontology and ethics.Meanwhile the inventions in his ethics can only be manifested by referring to his conception of desire.The most important facet in his thought is the new essence and proprieties with which he has endowed desire： for example,desire no longer takes deficiency as its own essential determination but becomes the expression of power;desire no longer takes good or evil as its own criterion of valuation but is beyond good and evil.Thus we can expect to form a new image of Spinoza’s ethics and even of his system of philosophy as a whole.