期刊文献+

美国“太大不能倒”制度改革的缺陷——评《多德-弗兰克法案》的有序清算制度 被引量:3

Flaws in the Reform of "Too Big to Fail" in U.S.: Critical Analysis of Orderly Liquidation System in Dodd——Frank Act
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摘要 具有系统重要性的金融机构的倒闭会引发金融体系的崩溃,但对它们适用的"太大不能倒"政策又为这些金融机构提供了一种隐性的政府担保,引发它们激励过度从事高风险业务而引发金融危机。《多德-弗兰克法案》中的有序清算制度致力于解决太大不能倒问题,但却未能很好地平衡处理太大不能倒问题潜在的道德风险与解决危机期间大型复杂金融机构倒闭可能出现的系统风险的问题,其核心的几个制度都有捉襟见肘的尴尬。 The Failure of financial institutions of systemic importance will cause the system-wide debacle. But the application of Too-Big-to-Fail policy to prevent the problem may also provide an implied government guarantee which generates moral hazard in financial institutions and make them overtake risky business. Orderly Liquidation System in Dodd-Frank Act tries to solve this dilemma but fails to address the problems successfully due to some flaws in its core regimes.
作者 隋平
出处 《湖南大学学报(社会科学版)》 CSSCI 北大核心 2012年第5期145-148,共4页 Journal of Hunan University(Social Sciences)
关键词 系统性风险 太大不能倒 道德风险 有序清算 systemic risk too-big-to-fail moral hazard orderly liquidation
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参考文献7

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