考虑价格上限的寡头发电投资阈值与容量选择

Investment threshold and capacity choice with price cap in oligopoly electric power market

发电容量投资不足或过剩都将带来巨大经济与社会损失.论文针对需求不确定且存在价格上限的情况,分析寡头发电商均衡的报价策略,在此基础上,运用实物期权和博弈论思想,构建寡头发电商投资阈值与容量选择模型,并通过数值仿真方法,分析对称寡头发电商的投资阈值与容量选择、最优价格上限与发电商数量,结果表明:1)价格上限较低时,寡头发电商会延迟投资,但总的投资容量会随发电商数量的增多而递增,而在价格上限较高时,则相反;2)最优的价格上限是无穷大,但发电投资商的数量对电力市场的可持续发展非常关键.

Either excess or shortage of generation power capacity investment will lead to huge economic and social losses. In the paper, bidding strategies of power producers in the oligopoly power market, are analysed, and investment threshold and capacity choice with price under uncertain demand cap was modeled, using real option and game theory. Numerical simulation were used to analyse the optimal investment threshold and ca- pacity choice of investors, optimal price cap, and the number of producers. The results indicate ： 1 ） when the price cap is lower, power producers will postpone their investment, but total equilibrium capacity be decreasing with the number of power investors the opposite case is true when the price cap is high. 2） optimal price cap is infi- nite, and the number of power investors is key to the sustainable development of electric power industry.