激励机制下监理机构参与工程保险的技术服务

Engineering supervisors' involvement in the technical service of engineering insurance in the perspective of incentives mechanism

我国工程保险的发展存在着体制、环境和技术等3方面障碍,保险公司可以委托建设单位招标选定的监理机构提供相应的风险管理技术服务来克服其中的技术障碍。文章分析多任务委托代理模型,研究委托任务之间的关系,讨论建设单位、保险公司和监理机构等参与方的收益情况,认为在一定激励机制下,建设单位、保险公司和监理机构3方的合作存在较强的纳什均衡,都将取得自身收益最大化,使质量控制和安全管理在互补中相互统一,降低保险公司承揽工程保险业务的风险。

Engineering insurance is hindered by obstacles of system, environment and technologies in its development in China. To overcome the obstacles, insurance companies could entrust the su- pervision agencies selected by bidding to offer the technical services of risks management. The mod- el of multi-task principal-agent and the correlation among the entrusted tasks are analysed. The earnings of the construction organization （ employer）, the insurance company and the supervision agencies are discussed. With the incentives mechanism, a strong Nash equilibrium among the con- struction organization, the insurance company and the supervision agencies is denoted. The equilib- rium is aimed at obtaining the maximum individual returns. It is held that the three partners should strive to balance the quality control and the safety management in complementation to lower the risks of the engineering insurance business of the insurance cornnania~.