多部件采购外包的两阶段均衡投标策略

A Two-stage Equilibrium Bidding Strategy in Outsourcing Procurement of Multiple Components

本文考虑一个由单个制造商和多个供应商群体组成的供应链——该制造商需要采购多个部件,对于每个部件在市场上均存在多个供应商。不同于传统的从各供应商群体分别采购各个部件,制造商考虑将所有部件的采购整体外包给某个供应商。在第一阶段,制造商使用一级价格密封投标的逆向拍卖来确定赢得整体采购合约的供应商。接下来,第一阶段投标的获胜者生产其所能供应的部件,并使用逆向拍卖向第一阶段中未获胜的其他竞标者采购其余部件。我们分析了供应商在两个阶段的均衡竞价策略,并比较了制造商在亲自逐件采购和外包整体采购两种情况下的期望采购成本。我们证明了在两种机制下制造商的总的期望采购成本相等。

Procurement and outsourcing are two important topics for many firms. An increased number of companies outsouree some of their internal functions to the third party in order to focus on their core competencies and improve their competitive advantage in the market. The popularity of outsourcing is growing, as both successes and failures have been observed in practice. It remains unclear about how the outsourcing decision influences each party＇s behavior and strategic decisions under different procurement mechanisms. In this paper we model a supply chain system in which a manufacturer purchases multiple components. For each component, there are multiple suppliers capable of providing it. The manufacturer considers outsoureing the procurement of all components to one of his suppliers, rather than purchasing them by himself. Since the production costs are not publicly known, auctions are used to reward the contract. In the first stage, the manufacturer uses the first-price sealed-bid reverse auction to determine which Supplier wins the outsourcing contract. Then, the winner of the first auction produces the component that the company is able to provide, and uses reverse auctions to procure the required components from the subset of the suppliers in the first auction. We analyze a supplier＇s bidding strategies in both stages. In the second period the supplier＇s bidding strategy is independent of the publicly announced winning price in the first stage. The boundary conditions and differential equations are used to help formulate the supplier＇s bidding strategies in the first period. The supplier＇s first-period bidding price for the whole package can be decomposed into expected costs associated with all components. We also compare a manufacturer＇s total procurement cost when a manufacturer purchases components by itself versus when integral procurement is auctioned. The result shows that the total expected procurement costs are identical under both mechanisms. Furthermore, an explicit solution of bidding strategies for all suppliers can be derived for a special case, where the supplier＇s cost distributions are uniform. We also provide a numerical example to illustrate the supplier＇sinformation channels. All these problems cause huge losses to enterprises in the supply chain. The occurrence of emergencies may destroy a well-coordinated supply chain and make it difficult to fully achieve its function. In addition, emergencies may disrupt the supply chain and endanger the survival and development of enterprises in the supply chain. Many factors have resulted in the implementation of the closed-looped supply chain by enterprises. These factors include the increased awareness of environmental protection and sustainable development, resource shortage, and the acceptance of reverse supply chains. Therefore, it is practically and theoretically important to understand the impact of emergencies on the closed-loop supply chain and learn more about the effectiveness of using different contracts to cope with emergencies. This paper considers a closed-loop supply chain consisting of one manufacturer and one retailer. The manufacturer produces only one kind of product with short life cycle, long ordering time and low remnant value. The manufacturer commissions the retailer to sell its products and recycle them in the end of their life cycle. In the end of each sales season, the manufacturer recycles and processes rubbish products so that they can be reused as a new product to satisfy the retailer＇s ordering demand. This paper first analyzes the coordination function of a closed-loop supply chain with rebate and penalty contract, and then discusses the impact of emergencies on the closed-loop supply chain coordination under market demand disruption. Finally, this paper explores how to carry out closed-loop supply chain coordination under disruption and effectively cope with emergencies. Four main conclusions are derived as follows： （ 1 ） Under the stochastic market demand, the closed-loop supply chain can be carried out with rebate and penalty contracts; （2） The optimal ordering quantity will be changed, and the optimal reclaiming price will not change under market demand disruption ; （3） When market demand is changed by emergencies, the closed-loop supply chain cannot carry out with original rebate and penalty contract. The closed-loop supply chain coordination may be hampered by market demand disruption; and （4） An adjusted rebate and penalty contract can coordinate the closed-loop supply chain and enable it to cope with emergencies.