回馈与惩罚契约下闭环供应链应对突发事件的协调性研究

The Impact of Emergencies on the Closed-loop Supply Chain Coordination under Rebate and Penalty Contracts

考虑一个制造商和一个零售商组成的闭环供应链,在考虑随机性需求下,首先分析了回馈与惩罚契约对闭环供应链的协调作用;然后,探讨了回馈与惩罚契约对突发事件的协调作用,研究表明:基准的回馈与惩罚契约对突发事件将不再发挥协调作用,为此,给出了闭环供应链对突发事件的最优应对策略,并调整了原来的回馈与惩罚契约使其具有抗突发事件性。

Since the 21st century, the frequent occurrence of emergencies has made people realize that we are living in a society full of emergencies. Emergency can cause problems such as the fluctuation of market demand, supply chain interruption, delay delivery of raw materials or finished product, the rapid increase of production cost or sale cost, and the devastation of transportation system, andinformation channels. All these problems cause huge losses to enterprises in the supply chain. The occurrence of emergencies may destroy a well-coordinated supply chain and make it difficult to fully achieve its function. In addition, emergencies may disrupt the supply chain and endanger the survival and development of enterprises in the supply chain. Many factors have resulted in the implementation of the closed-looped supply chain by enterprises. These factors include the increased awareness of environmental protection and sustainable development, resource shortage, and the acceptance of reverse supply chains. Therefore, it is practically and theoretically important to understand the impact of emergencies on the closed-loop supply chain and learn more about the effectiveness of using different contracts to cope with emergencies. This paper considers a closed-loop supply chain consisting of one manufacturer and one retailer. The manufacturer produces only one kind of product with short life cycle, long ordering time and low remnant value. The manufacturer commissions the retailer to sell its products and recycle them in the end of their life cycle. In the end of each sales season, the manufacturer recycles and processes rubbish products so that they can be reused as a new product to satisfy the retailer＇s ordering demand. This paper first analyzes the coordination function of a closed-loop supply chain with rebate and penalty contract, and then discusses the impact of emergencies on the closed-loop supply chain coordination under market demand disruption. Finally, this paper explores how to carry out closed-loop supply chain coordination under disruption and effectively cope with emergencies. Four main conclusions are derived as follows： （ 1 ） Under the stochastic market demand, the closed-loop supply chain can be carried out with rebate and penalty contracts; （2） The optimal ordering quantity will be changed, and the optimal reclaiming price will not change under market demand disruption ; （3） When market demand is changed by emergencies, the closed-loop supply chain cannot carry out with original rebate and penalty contract. The closed-loop supply chain coordination may be hampered by market demand disruption; and （4） An adjusted rebate and penalty contract can coordinate the closed-loop supply chain and enable it to cope with emergencies.