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考虑努力水平和决策风险偏好的供应链期权销量担保模型 被引量:18

Supply Chain Sale-surety Option Contract with Effort Dependent Demand and Risk Preference
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摘要 对销售商和供应商组成的简单两级供应链,在供应链参与企业的风险偏好影响其决策选择,以及在需求随机并受销售商营销努力水平影响的市场环境下,建立了基于销量担保期权的供应链契约模型。提供了一种基于期望损失的期权定价方法,分析了努力水平和决策风险偏好双重因素对参与企业的决策及其供应链协调的影响。研究表明在考虑努力水平和决策风险偏好差异时,单纯的期权销量契约无法实现供应链协调。为此,引入收益共享和努力成本共担策略,对原契约模型加以修正。在修正契约中,当收益共享比例和努力成本共担比例满足一定条件时,修正的期权销量担保契约可以实现供应链协调。最后,提供了一种模型优化分析方法,并通过案例分析说明了研究结论的有效性。 With the development of market environment, the traditional supply chain contracts are faced with increasing challenge in guiding the current business practice. Under the new supply chain environment, it is necessary to explore a new concept of supply chain collaboration and a new mode] of supply chain contract based on this concept. In this paper, based on the previous studies, for the current new model of business cooperation, a model of supply chain sale- surety option contract is set up. This contract is designed and led by retailer. Retailers sell sale-surety option, and suppliers purchase it, and at the same time, suppliers access the amount of sales guarantee corresponding to the option. If sales volume is lower than the guarantee's, suppliers will be compensated. Retailers, who have hypermarkets, by improving the stores popularity, attract suppliers enter the market to sale product. Suppliers decide to buy the ideal number of option, and retailers provide sale-surety corresponding to the option. In practice the effort level of retailers will affect products' demand, and the risk attitude of decision makers will affect their decision-making behavior. So this paper puts the effort level and risk preference of decision-making of node enterprise into decision- making model, and analyses their impact to the decision and cooperation of supply-chain. Along the idea of modeling, this paper first discusses, under the influence of the two factors mentioned above, the decision- making choice and decision-making characteristics of enterprises involved in supply-chain which based on sale-surety option contract. And then discusses the conditions to achieve supply chain coordination. And analyses the influence of the two factors to enterprises' decision-making and supply chain coordination. The result shows, when the effort level and risk preference are considered, pure sale- surety option contract can not achieve supply chain coordination. Then this paper introduces revenue sharing and effort cost partaking policies to original model and modifies it, and discusses the decision-making choice and decision-making characteristics of enterprises^involved in supply-chain under the amended contract scheme. The result shows, in the amended contract, when the revenue sharing ratio and the ratio of effort cost partaking meet some conditions, the amended contract can achieve supply chain coordination. In the end, a model optimization method is presented, and the validity of conclusions is illustrated through case studies.
作者 胡本勇 陈旭
出处 《管理工程学报》 CSSCI 北大核心 2012年第3期184-190,共7页 Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management
基金 中国博士后科学基金特别资助项目(201003691) 中国博士后科学基金面上资助项目(20090461323) 教育部人文社科青年基金资助项目(09YJC630020) 国家自然科学基金重点资助项目(70932005)
关键词 担保期权 努力水平 决策风险偏好 收益共享 供应链协调 surety-options effort risk preference revenue-sharing supply chain coordination
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参考文献17

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二级参考文献6

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