摘要
为让管理水平较高的私营集团获得BOT项目特许权,并实现项目社会福利最大,本文利用机制设计理论建立了一个关于BOT项目投资与特许权期的二维招标合同的直接机制模型。通过模型分析,获得了该招标机制的可行性条件,最优形式和相应配置方案,并由一个算例表明,得到的最优招标机制在实际中是有效的。所获结果为政府对BOT特许权招标提供了一种理论指导和实际方法。
Tendering and bidding are two important trading mechanisms. However, many Build-Operate-Transfer (BOT) projects are having issues with the concession bid. For instance, private groups sometimes falsify bidding information in order to win a bid from Chinese government. Therefore, it is important to redesign tendering and bidding mechanisms in order to maximize the social welfare of a BOT project. There is a lack of study on concession tender issues for BOT projects. This paper investigates a two-dimensional tender problem associated with BOT project's investment and concession period. We also consider the effect of the concession period on the private investment in the tendering practice. A direct tendering mechanism model on BOT project's investment and concession period is proposed according to the mechanism design theory. The proposed model can help derive the feasible condition, optimal form, and corresponding distribution program for the implementation of tendering mechanism. Firstly, it is difficult for the government to know the private group's information, such as themanagement level in the tendering process. A direct tendering mechanism model on the BOT project's investment and concession term is proposed. The model enables us to obtain the optimal direct tender mechanism and test its feasibility. Secondly, to select the private group with the highest management level for the project implementation, the distribution program for the BOT project's concession tender is discussed based on the analysis of optimal direct tender mechanism. The discussion results indicate that the BOT concession tender with the inclusion of the competing bidding variable can not only help the government choose a private investor with the highest management level from the fury competing market, but also maximize the project's benefits. Finally, the analysis of a computing example shows that the obtained conclusions not only are valid and applicable, but also provide the government with a theoretical guidance and a practical approach for implementing BOT project's concession tender.
出处
《管理工程学报》
CSSCI
北大核心
2012年第3期191-196,共6页
Journal of Industrial Engineering and Engineering Management
基金
国家自然科学基金重点资助项目(70831002)
国家自然科学基金资助项目(71173103
70971061
71101069)
教育部人文社会科学研究一般资助项目(10YJA790183)
教育部人文社科青年基金资助项目(12YJCZH017)
江苏省社会科学基金资助项目(09EYB010)
江苏省普通高校研究生科研创新计划资助项目(CX10B_020R)
关键词
BOT项目
项目投资
特许权期
招标合同
最优机制
BOT project
project investment
concession term
tender contract
optimal mechanism