国有企业改制、董事会独立性与投资效率

State - owned Enterprises Restructuring,Board Independence,and Investment Efficiency

本文研究了国有企业改制模式对上市公司投资效率的影响,以及独立董事在其中的作用。研究结果表明,由于存续分立公司的大股东代理问题和管理者代理问题比非存续分立公司严重,使得其投资效率显著低于非存续分立公司,独立董事可以减少因大股东的利益输送而造成的投资不足问题,但没有证据显示独立董事可以减少因管理者代理问题而产生的过度投资问题。上述结果说明,国有企业改制模式和董事会独立性对于国有企业改制效果具有重要影响;由于投资不足和过度投资的形成机制不同,因而独立董事对其的公司治理作用也有所差异。本文丰富了国有企业改制和独立董事公司治理作用方面的研究。

The paper investigates the effects of state - owned enterprises restructuring type, board independ- ence, and their interaction on the investment efficiency. It is found that incompletely restructured companies＇ investment efficiency is lower than that of completely restructured companies due to the incompletely restruc- tured companies＇ agency problems of managers, and controlling shareholder are more serious than the completely restructured companies. Independent directors can reduce underinvestment by reduce controlling shareholders＇ tunneling problems, but have no significant effects on overinvestment. Since investment is an important resource allocation behavior, and board structure is an important corporate governance mechanism. The above findings show how state - owned enterprise restructuring type affect resource allocation efficiency and board independ- ence affect the effectiveness of state - owned enterprise restructuring, and enriched our understanding about SOE reform and corporate governance role of board independence.