中国股市的业绩预告可信吗？

Are Management Earnings Forecasts in China Credible to the Stock Market?

与美国等西方国家上市公司的业绩预告行为截然不同的是,国内符合业绩预告范围的上市公司需在第三季度报告中予以全年业绩的预告,而且业绩预告往往伴随多次对预期业绩的修正公告。本文研究业绩预告的修正行为对业绩预告可信度的影响。研究发现业绩预告和业绩修正公告本身都具有显著的信息含量,但资本市场投资人更相信在会计年度结束后发布的业绩预告。对业绩预期的修正使上市公司以后年度发布的业绩预告的可信度受到强烈质疑,股市对有修正历史的上市公司的业绩预告反应强度明显低于无修正历史公司的业绩预告。在近期三年内对业绩修正的次数越多,与最近年度修正业绩的时间间隔越短,业绩预告的可信度被质疑得越强烈。本文研究结果为业绩预告政策实施对股市带来的经济后果和资本市场信息披露的监管提供重要的借鉴意义。

In contrast to the voluntary management earnings forecast practice in the western countries, the Chi- nese Securities Regulatory Committee requires Chinese companies issue earnings forecast in the third - quarter report if the annual earnings are foreseen to be in a certain range. However, these forecasts are often times fol- lowed with frequent forecast revisions. This paper examines the impact of forecast revisions on the credibility of management earnings forecast. The results show that both management earnings forecasts and forecast revisions contain significant information, and more so for earnings forecast issued after the fiscal year - ends. However, the fact that companies revise previous forecasts will significantly damage the credibility of future forecasts and to a larger degree for finns that revise forecasts frequently in the past three years and recently. This paper pro- vides empirical evidence on the economic consequences of mandatory earnings forecast policy and provides im- portant implications for the regulatory policy on the information disclosure in the Chinese stock market.