委托—代理框架下的产业研发激励机制研究

A Research on the Incentive Mechanism of Industrial R&D Investment in the Principal-Agent Framework

为了使有限的财政科技经费能够有效的激励企业扩大研发支出,需要对研发激励机制进行合理的设计。由于不同产业间存在禀赋上的差异,导致研发回报率差异较大,企业进行自主研发的积极性也不尽相同。在委托—代理框架下引入研发回报率作为观测因子,改进了委托—代理激励模型,求解出最优激励合同,并以山东省专业设备制造业为例进行了实证研究。结果表明引入研发回报率可以优化财政科研经费在激励企业自主研发和补偿企业研发风险上的分配关系,提高了合同的激励强度。

It requires a rational design for R＆D incentive mechanism to encourage enterprises to expand R＆D spending effectively with limited government R＆D funding. Due to the differences in endowments, enterprises＇ en- thusiasm of independent research and rate of return on R＆D are inconsistent in different industries. Therefore, we introduced the rate of return on R＆D as an observation factor to the principal - agent model, improved the principal - agent incentive model, solved the optimal incentive contract, and did an empirical study on Shandong professional equipment manufacturing. The results show that the distributional relationship of government research funding be- tween R＆D risk compensation and independent research incentive can be coordinated effectively and the incentive strength of contract will be improved by introducing rate of return on R＆D as an observation factor to the principal - agent framework,