试用期条款对人力资源管理决策影响的经济分析——基于“逆向选择”的规制视角

Economic Analysis on Influence of Probationary Period on Decision-making of Human Resources Management——From Regulation Perspective of "Adverse Selection"

《劳动合同法》对试用期条款做了进一步的规定,规定了试用期限,同时也规定了试用期内的最低工资。为了明确该试用期条款对企业人力资源管理的决策影响,从"逆向选择"规制的角度,采用拉齐尔的"自我选择"理论模型,并结合Wat-kins序列博弈关系中的"Q-学习关系"理论,分别分析了试用期期限以及试用期最低工资对企业的人才甄选、试用期工资制定以及转正后工资设置等决策的影响。通过分析,得到以下结论:在其他条件不变的情况下,试用期期限延长,企业倾向于降低蒙混过关的概率,提高试用期期间的工资,降低转正后的工资;在其他条件不变的情况下,提高试用期的法律工资支付,会倾向于使企业的甄选成本上升,转正后的工资降低。并得出关于试用期立法的几点启示。

The provision of probationary period in Labor Contract Law not only regulates the deadline,but also provides the minimum wage.Based on Lazear’s self-selection model and combination of Wat-kins’＂Q-learner ＂ relation of sequence game theory,and also from regulation perspective of ＂ adverse selection＂,this paper,in order to confirm influence of probation terms on decision-making of human resources management,analyzes the influences of the probationary period and the minimum wage in the probation period on the employer’s decision： selection decision,probation salary formulation,as well as the salary confirmation after becoming a full member.The result shows that in case that other conditions remain unchanged,when the probationary period is extended,companies tend to reduce the probability of false pretenses： increase the wages of probationary period and lower employee’s wages after their gaining formal qualifications;in case other conditions remain unchanged,when payment of wages in the probationary period is improved,companies tend to increase their selection costs and lower employee’s wages after their gaining formal qualifications.Finally,this paper draws on the inspiration of probationary period legislation.