面向争议领域的军事威慑信号博弈分析

Military Deterrence Signaling Game Analysis Based on Argumentative Domains

围绕争议领域蕴藏的丰厚价值,有关国家不断展开军事博弈。基于此,分析了威慑方为捍卫主权完整可能采用的威慑方式和被威慑方为应对威慑恐吓而采取的对策,构建了基于争议领域的军事威慑信号博弈模型(Military Deterrence Signaling Game Model,MDSGM)。将信号博弈理论和完美贝叶斯均衡思想引入MDSGM,探讨了均衡存在的类型和条件。算例表明,采用虚实结合、真假参杂的威慑信号传递方式,能达到"不战而屈人之兵"的目的,验证了模型的可行性和有效性,得出的结果能为决策者提供辅助参考。

Since argumentative domains are valuable, many military games are done continuously between relative countries. Methods taken by the deterrence patter are analyzed, the same as the counter- deterrence patter. Then the Military Deterrence Signaling Game Model （MDSGM） is built. The signaling game and perfect bayesian equilibrium are used to MDSGM, and the types and conditions of the equilibrium are discussed. The example shows that if actual and common deterrence signals are transferred synchronous, and the deterrence patter will own without battles. The reliability and feasibility of the model are validated, and some references are given to conductors.