过度投资、债务结构与治理效应——来自中国房地产上市公司的经验证据

Overinvestment, Debt Structure and Governance Effect: Evidence from Listed Real Estate Companies in China

近年来房地产市场过热问题引发广泛关注,那么房地产企业是否存在过度投资开发行为,政府紧缩信贷的调控政策又如何能更好地发挥作用?本文以2006～2010年房地产上市公司为研究样本,借鉴Richardson投资模型对我国房地产上市公司的过度投资行为进行度量,发现房地产开发企业存在用自由现金流进行过度投资的行为。进一步通过债务融资与过度投资之间的关系进行实证分析,发现债务融资总体上对房地产企业过度投资行为具有抑制作用,其中银行借款不能抑制其过度投资行为,反而与过度投资呈正向关系;商业信用能有效抑制其过度投资行为。

Recently the overheating realestate market has invoked wide attention. Do the real estate corporations overinvest? How can the adjusting policy come into effect? This paper draws Richardson investment model to measure the inefficient investment in Chinese listed real estate companies, using the 2006-2010 listed corporation as sample, finds that they have overinvestment behavior. After that, we empirically analyze the relationship between debt finance and overinvestment, find that debt has refraining effect over overinvestment as a whole, while the bank loan promote instead refraining overinvestment.