关于国有资产流失问题的思考——基于委托代理关系的角度

Reflections on the Loss of State Assets——Based on the Perspective of Principal-agent Relationship

随着我国改革开放以及市场经济的发展,个体经济和民营经济得到了长足的发展。在许多产业中实行了国退民进的策略,许多国营企业也从私有化中得到了新的活力。然而,在国退民进的过程中,国有资产流失的问题也越来越引起人们的关注。国有资产流失的原因复杂,但本文主要讨论由于委托代理问题产生的经营管理者与企业所有者的利益不一致所造成的国有资产流失。当前利用委托代理理论对国有资产进行分析时,大多数文献都假定国有资产的所有者是公民,而代理者是政府任命的管理者,从而着重对委托人和代理人双方的博弈进行分析,进而得到相应的结论。本文指出,在国有企业的实际经营过程中,国有资产的所有者并非是公民,因此上述理论中的博弈在现实中并未真正实现,与之相应的一系列博弈机制与激励约束机制并非是有效的。本文试图建立有效的博弈机制,促使委托人与代理人更好地发挥各自的职能,从委托代理的角度解决国有资产流失的问题。

With China＇s reform and opening up and development of market economy, individual economy and private economy has been gaining considerable development. Privatization strategy has been carried out in many industries, which has brought vitality to many state-owned enterprises. However, in the process of privatization, loss of state assets is also becoming a big concern. There are complex reasons for it, but this article mainly focuses on the reason of principal-agent problem induced by conflicting interests of managers and business owners.In the current analyzing state-owned assets through principal-agent theory, most of the literature assumes that the owner of state-owned assets are citizens and the agents are government-appointed managers, which focuses on the principal and agent＇ game, and then get the appropriate conclusions. This article points out that in the actual operation of the state-owned enterprises, the owner is not citizens, so the game in the above theory cannot be realized in reality and the corresponding game mechanism and incentive constraiiat mechanism are not effective.. This paper attempts to establish an effective game mechanism to prompt the principal and the agent to function better and solve the problem of loss of state assets from the perspective of principal-agent.