新独断论:一种新的知识辩护

New Dogmatism:A New Defense of Knowledge

知觉知识何以可能的问题是知识论的核心问题。普赖尔的新独断论代表了这个问题的最新进展。不过,它并未解决经验的可错性与经验辩护的充分性之间的矛盾,因而暴露出可击败性悖论。麦克道尔的析取论蕴涵了这样的观点:知觉经验可通过向知觉信念移交罗素式内容的方式为知觉信念提供充分辩护。这是一种新独断论,可称其为麦克道尔的新独断论。麦克道尔的新独断论认为,知觉经验要么为知觉信念提供排除了错误的辩护,要么根本就不能提供辩护。麦克道尔的新独断论可以避开可击败性悖论,并且,我们可以从中发展出一种新型的两组分知识论,即知觉知识是得到了辩护的知觉信念。两组分知识论将辩护与真融合到了一起,为解决盖梯尔问题带来了新希望。两组分知识论没有自举问题,是一个强健的知识论。

Perceptual knowledge is highlighted in recent discussion of epistemology. Many efforts has been made to ask the question： how perceptual knowledge is possible？ Recently, James Pryor has suggested a bold solution, that is, dogmatism. In appraising Pryor＇s dogmatism, this paper concludes that Pryor＇s dogmatism is right in confirming the sufficiency of perceptual justification, but it cannot explain why perceptual justification is sufficient for perceptual knowledge. The author argues that dogmatism based on epistemologieal disjunctivism can do. According to disjunetivist dogmatism, perceptual experience can give perceptual belief falsehood-excluding justification. This kind of justification is sufficient for perceptual knowledge. This paper also argues that a two-constituent theory of knowledge can be drawn from disjunctivist dogmatism, according which perceptual knowledge is justified perceptual belief. The new two-constituent theory of knowledge drawn from disjunctivist dogmatism can shed great lights on the solution of the Gettier Problem. Finally, this paper shows the two-constituent theory of knowledge does not have the trouble of bootstrapping and thus is a robust theory of knowledge.