机构投资者持股与中国上市公司现金股利政策

Institutional Ownership and Cash Dividend Policy of Chinese Listed Companies

本文基于上市公司现金股利政策的视角,深入考察机构投资者的监督治理效应、投资行为偏好,以及不同类型的机构投资者之间是否存在异质性。以中国A股上市公司为样本,实证发现:(1)机构投资者持股比例较高的上市公司具有显著更高的现金股利支付意愿和支付水平,表明机构投资者对上市公司现金股利政策发挥了积极的监督效应;(2)高派现上市公司吸引了更高的机构投资者持股比例,显示机构投资者将现金股利视为其构建投资组合的关键要素,遵循了"谨慎人规则";(3)不同类型的机构投资者在现金股利的监督效应、股利偏好方面并没有呈现出明显的异质性,揭示着我国各类机构投资者可能存在趋同的投资风格;(4)我国机构投资者倾向于将现金股利政策视为上市公司传递的一种"信号"而非解决传统代理冲突的治理机制。

At the present time, the institutional investors, including securities investment fund, brokers, social security, QFII and insurance etc, show the diversified development situation in Chinese capital market. Based on the perspective of listed companies＇ cash dividend policy, this paper examines whether different kinds of institutional investors show differences in corporate governance effects and their investment behaviors, and compares whether there is difference between institutional investors. Using a sample of Chinese A-share listed companies, our empirical results show that, （1） the higher institutional ownership, the higher cash dividend payout ratio and propensity to pay, showing that institutional investors play a monitoring role in listed companies＇ cash dividend policy; （2） the higher cash dividend payout ratio and propensity to pay, the higher institutional ownership, indicating that institutional investors follow the ＂Prudent Man Rule＂; （3） different kinds of institutional investors do not show heterogeneity of corporate governance and preference of cash dividends, revealing that various kinds of institutional investors in China may have convergent investment styles; （4） institutional investors tend to understand the cash dividends as a ＂signal＂ by listed companies rather than a mechanism for solving the traditional agency conflicts.