中国金融发展提高了资本产出效率吗?——实证检验与理论解释(1981～2009)

Does Financial Development Promote Capital-output Efficiency in China?——Empirical Test and Theoretical Explanation

本文通过哈罗德—多玛均衡增长模型的一个修正模型来阐述金融发展对资产的选择效应,并将经济增长中的数量因素与效率因素分别提炼出来加以区别。实证检验结果显示,我国金融发展促进了投资数量增加,但投资效率却不断下降,利率的金融杠杆作用丧失,金融发展出现了"扭曲"。这种"扭曲"的根源在于我国金融体系的"分割性",即形成了两种不同性质的借款者,他们面临着完全不同的融资环境,并对应着不同的投资函数:一种是基于新古典主义模型的投资函数;另一种是基于"自我融资"模型的投资函数。我国投资产出效率较低是在这种"分割性"金融体系下,单纯追求GDP高增长的内生结果。因此,政府应当进一步从微观经济活动中退出,特别是要约束政府对于金融系统的控制能力。

This paper revised Harrod-Domar model to explain the financial development＇s effects for capital-out-put efficiency in China. The financial development＇s quantity effects and efficiency effects are extracted to be distin- guished. Empirical test results show that the capital-output efficiency play a negative role in China＇s GDP growth, however, the quantity of investment plays a positive role. The results strongly suggest that the efficiency of China＇sinvestment is on the decline and it also shows that China＇s economic growth relies on the expansion of the volume of investments, rather than improved efficiency. Further analysis we will find that the real interest rate has little effect, indicating that China can not reduce the low efficiency of investment through raising the real interest rates, and also can not lead to the effective allocation of funds, the interest rates＇ role of financial leverage is Distorted. According to international experience, a country＇s financial development can promote savings, investment, and thus promote eco-nomic growth through the improvement of the investment volume, but, more important, it plays a role by increasing the efficiency of investment. Alan. Gclb （1989） found that the role of efficiency improvement is critical in promoting economic growth, and the efficiency＇s role is 4 times than the quantity. However,Why China is so different？ To ex- plain this anomaly,we have to go back to the special financial system in China. China＇s financial system is actually split;this ＂split＂ is mainly reflected by the different nature of the borrowers who faced with a completely differentfinancing environment. Financial resource allocation rights whose Ownership discrimination lead the loans mainly flow in China are concentrated in the state-owned banks, to the state-owned enterprises or local government, due to the impact of the government＇s multiple objectives, a lot of money flows to inefficient enterprises and projects. For the private sector, especially the vast rural areas, it is difficult to obtain funds from the banking system. Private en- trepreneurs have good investment opportunities, but can not melt into the funds from the bank, and therefore can not take advantage of these opportunities ,which makes the private sector＇s venture capital; investment can only rely on self-financing. In this case, China has formed two parallel financial system, One is the private sector who can＇t （or rarely） get a loan, and it rely mainly on self-financing. The other is the state sector （including state-owned enterpri- ses and government departments at all levels） which can get a lot of loans, but they are inefficient. As a result, Chi-na forms two different types of borrowers, which face different investment functions ： one is based on the neoclassical model;one is based on ＂self-financing＂ model In this case, China＇s financial development has been distorted, al- though the private sector has more investment opportunities, but it is difficult to obtain financing from outside, so China has to invest through government instead of private sector, the aim is to break the financial constraints whichhinder economic growth. However, this approach makes the investment efficiency began to reduce gradually when the investment reaches a certain degree. Confronted with the problem, we propose the following recommendations： First, to accelerate the process of financial development, further improve the operating mechanism of financial markets, and take effective measures to reduce the threshold for the low-income sectors to get the loan, at the same time, ac- tively regulate the development of securities markets, improve the size and depth of securities markets, and thus ease the problem of credit rationing and credit constraints. Second, the government should optimize the financial struc- ture, and actively promote the development of non-national financial sector, and give full play to the role of local fi- nancial institutions to provide adequate financial support for the economic development of regional economy as well as local individuals. Third, it is necessary to lower the government＇s financial regulatory powers, and to improve the level of financial suoervision, the Government should be further out from the micro-economic activities.