自我保存与公意--卢梭作为一个霍布斯主义者

Self-preservation and the General Will——Rousseau as A Hobbesian

卢梭继承了霍布斯的自我保存原理,并以此来应对霍布斯遗留的问题:个人作为自我保存的判断者与普遍的自然法之间的张力;个人基于不可放弃的自然权利与国家之间的冲突。在强调自然人的激情较之于理性的优先性的同时,卢梭推进了霍布斯对自然法的批判。为应对个体与国家的紧张关系,卢梭从自我保存推导出公意。借助公意,个人在完全转让自然权利的同时,仍然拥有作为自我保存的判断者的自由。不过,特殊意志与公意的对立的持存表明,卢梭没有完全处理掉个人与国家之间的紧张关系。这源于契约论论证权力合法性的要求。

Rousseau bases on Hobbes’s principle of self-preservation to cope with the Hobbesian problem. In order to deal with the tension between the individual as the judger of self-preservation and the universal law of nature, Rousseau insists the priority of passion in natural man, and prompts Hobbes’s critique of natural law. In order to deal with the tension between the state and the individual who has an unalienable natural rights of resistance, Rousseau derives the general will from the self-preservation. Through the general will, the individual still has the freedom as the judger of his own preservation when he totally alienates his natural rights. However, the subsisting contradiction between the particular will and the general will shows that Rousseau does not remove the tension between the individual and the state. For it derives from the justification of the legitimacy of the political power.