地方政府债务风险规制的博弈分析

Game Analysis on the regulation of local government debt risk

以博弈论为分析工具,文章建立了中央政府与地方政府的静态博弈支付矩阵,通过引入地方政府过度举债被中央政府监管发现后所付出的成本、地方政府债务风险被媒体曝光而导致公众的担忧等变量,在一定程度上解释了中央政府和地方政府在债务风险控制上达成一致的均衡条件;由于地方政府间在发展经济过程中存在竞争关系,因此文章考察了地方政府间举债发展的重复博弈模型,通过引入奖励变量,改变了地方政府过度举债的纳什均衡解。结论为中央政府严格监管与适当奖励的搭配使用可以把地方政府的债务风险规制在合理的水平。

The article has established the static game payoff matrix of central government （CG） with local government （LG） by using the game theory as the analysis tool. Then by introducing the variables of the cost of LG＇ excessive borrowing which is paid in the discovery of the CG＇s regulation and Public concern of media exposure about LG＇s debt risk, we explained the equilibrium conditions of the central and local governments to reach agreement on the debt risk control to some extent; Because the Competitive relationship exists among the LGs in the process of economic development, therefore the article examines the repeated game model of LGs＇ excessive borrowing for development, through the introduction of the reward variable; we changed the Nash equilibrium solution of over-borrowing of LG. The conclusion is that CG with strict regulation and appropriate incentives can make risk regulation of LG debt at a reasonable level.