规模不经济下主从竞争供应链两部定价合同研究

Two part tariff contract of competitive supply chain of stackelberg mode with diseconomy of scale

基于链与链市场地位不平等和制造商规模不经济情形,考察具有先后决策顺序的主从竞争供应链模型的纵向控制结构选择和两部定价合同能否实现供应链协调及各成员的帕累托改进.结果表明,规模不经济系数不会对两条链的均衡结构产生影响,从链收益在均衡结构下随市场竞争强度增加而增加.当市场竞争强度较弱时,合理引入两部定价合同能实现供应链协调及成员的帕累托改进.

Based on the situation of unequal positions between the competitive supply chains and the character of diseconomy of scale in the production progress of manufacturers, the paper discusses whether two part tariff contract can help to achieve supply chain coordination and the Pareto improvement between the members. The results show that the ratio of diseconomy of scale doesn＇t affect the equilibrium structure, and the profit of the follow chain increases with the competitive ratio increasing under the equilibrium structure. When the intensity of market competitive is weak, the reasonable two fixed price contract can help to achieve the supply chain coordination while both the manufacturer and retailer can have Pareto improvement.