融资需求、产权性质与股权融资歧视 --基于企业上市问题的研究

Financing Demand, Ownership Type, and Equity Financing Discrimination: A Research Based on the Issue of Going Public

本文研究了2004-2008年的企业上市问题。研究发现,相比国有企业,民营企业是否申请上市与企业外部融资需求的相关性更强。这说明外部融资需求对于民营企业是否申请上市的影响较大,国有企业申请上市更有可能是出于非经济因素的目的。进一步的研究表明,证监会发审委更有可能批准国有企业的上市申请。论文还发现,外部融资需求大、盈利能力好、位于市场化程度高的地区的企业更容易被批准上市。总之,论文的结论表明,目前的证券监管体制能够保证盈利能力好的企业更有可能被批准上市,从而使得证券市场的有限资源能够配置给业绩优良的企业。但是,"核准制"只能在一定程度上保证资源配置的有效性,政府在权益融资方面依然会照顾国有企业。

This paper investigates the issue of why firms go public dur- ing 2004 to 2008. We try to find out how firms＇ financing demand and ownership type affect firms＇ propensity to apply for initial public offer- ing （IPO）, as well as how firms＇ financing demand and ownership type affect firms＇ probability of getting IPO approval from China Securities Regulatory Commission （CSRC）. We argue that the positive relation- ship between firms＇ propensity to apply for IPO and external financing demand is stronger in Non-state-owned enterprises （non-SOEs） than that of State-owned enterprises （SOEs）. We further argue that compared with SOEs, non-SOEs have a lower probability of getting IPO approval from CSRC. Our hypotheses are tested using private firm data from the Annual Industrial Survey Database of the Chinese National Bureau of Statistics. Our empirical results show that, compared with SOEs, non- SOEs are more likely to apply for IPO when their external financing demands are large. This result indicates that non-SOEs are more likely to be affected by external financing demand while SOEs are more likely to apply for IPO for non-economic reasons. Further investigation also shows that CSRC is more likely to approve SOEs＇ IPO applications. Be- sides, firms with greater external financing demand, higher profitability, and located in more developed regions are more likely to be approved for IPO. These results indicate that firms with better performance have a higher probability of going public under the sanction system, and lim- ited financial resource can be allocated to these well-performed firms. But the sanction system cannot guarantee the efficiency of resource al- location. Compared with non-SOEs, SOEs are given a priority to issue equity. Our findings have implications for firms＇ IPO decisions and how to improve efficiency of the sanction system. The paper contributes to the literature of firms＇ going public in emerging markets and the role of government in resource allocation in IPO market.