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经济增长、行政体制改革与地方政府间分权 被引量:5

Economic Growth,Administrative System Reform and Decentralization in Local Governments
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摘要 20世纪90年代,中国出现以"强县扩权"为代表的地方政府间的分权化运动,如何理解这一现象的发生?本文在维护市场联邦制、政治锦标赛理论的基础上,通过考察中国行政分权的特点、方式,以及县域经济在中国现阶段的重要性等方面,构建内生政府分权理论予以解释。同时,本文也对政府间分权主体和分权方式的选择进行了分析说明,认为省政府对县(市)的分权有其必然性,并且"省直管县"是政治交易成本最低的一种分权方式。 In the 1990s, the movement of decentralization in local governments represented by "enlarging the authority of strong counties" appeared in China. How to understand this phenomenon? On the theoretical basis .of Market - Preserving Federalism and Promotion Tournament Model, the paper constructs "the endogenous government decentralization theory" to interpret this phenomenon through studying the characteristics and patterns of China's administrative decentrali- zation, as well as the importance of county economy in nowaday China. Meanwhile, based on the analysis on the main body and patterns of governmental decentralization, the paper holds that it is an inevitable choice for the provincial government to decentralize its powers to the county/city governments. And "province directly dominates the county" is the best way of decentralization with the lowest political transaction costs.
作者 周杰
出处 《经济与管理研究》 CSSCI 北大核心 2012年第10期5-12,共8页 Research on Economics and Management
关键词 地方政府 分权 行政体制改革 经济增长 Local Government Decentralization Administrative System Reform Economic Growth
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参考文献22

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