摘要
利用进化博弈理论研究赈灾资金使用的监察问题,建立了受灾地区地方政府与监管部门之间的非对称进化博弈模型,并利用微分方程的局部稳定性理论讨论了不同参数水平下的进化稳定策略,在此基础上提出相应的政策建议.
By using the evolutionary game theory,the monitoring problem to the relief funds using was studied.An asymmetric evolution game model was established between a local government officials and the supervision department.Differential equation of the local stability theory was used to discuss the different parameters of the level of the evolutionary stable strategy,and based on this,relevant policy suggestions were put forward.
出处
《重庆文理学院学报（自然科学版）》
2012年第5期49-52,共4页
Journal of Chongqing University of Arts and Sciences
关键词
赈灾资金
挪用
监察
进化博弈
进化稳定策略
relief funds
misappropriate
supervision
evolutionary game
evolutionary stable strategy
