信息与公司财务决策研究

Corporate Financing Choices Under Asymmetric Information

本文研究信息与公司财务决策的关系。通过一个决策模型从理论上得到如下结论 :信息是否对称影响公司决策 ,信息不对称时决策的披露具有信号效应 ,投资者将债务筹资看成一种“好消息” ,而将发行新股视为一种“坏消息” ,决策影响企业的市场价值。本文发现公司的筹资决策与企业内在价值的波动形式密切相关 ,企业并不总是按照啄食理论假设的顺序进行筹资。本文还对新股发行的时机选择进行了讨论。

This paper studies corporate financing choices under asymmetric information. Using a corporate decison model,we reach the following conclusions:Information disparity affects corporate financing choices. Whenever a decision is disclosed,it has the signaling effects. Outside investors will reason that the firm’s decision to issue shares signals “bad news” and issue debts conveys “good news”. We also discuss the issues of whether the corporate prefers debt to equity if outside funds are needed, and the timing of stock issues.