改变经理人员效用选择的方式——兼论会计委派制的产生动因及发展趋势

经理人员的不正当干涉一直是导致许多企业财务报表严重失真的直接原因 ,本文利用风险厌恶假设下的效用函数模型 ,对传统体制下企业经理人员的效用选择进行了分析 ,并得出其虚假会计信息的必然性。接下来 ,本文对改变经理人员效用选择的方式及当前实施各种方式的难点作了进一步的探讨。在此基础上 。

Managers illegimate interference is often direct reason for serious false of financial reporting.Using the model of utility function on the assumption of risk aversion,this article analyses the utility selection of managers in traditional system,and draw a conclusion that they necessarily provide false accounting informatiom.Then the author discusses the ways of changing managers utility selection and considers the difficulty in putting them into practice.Based on above points,he explains the drive of accoutant appointment system and predicts the development of it.