摘要
在经典价格竞争模型-伯川德模型的基础上,采用演化博弈理论和方法研究不完全信息条件下企业价格竞争的发生机理。结果表明：产品消费者价格敏感度、企业降价幅度及降价企业的类型都约束着激烈价格竞争的发生;较多企业在不进行价格合谋的条件下,可以自发演化为价格不变,从而从不完全信息的角度解决了伯川德悖论,揭示了企业价格竞争的内在机理。
It Was designed an experiment on semi-rigid horizontal force joints of pulley-dip supporting frame through three groups of specimens. By the analysis of experimental phenomena and data as well as the comparisons with joints rigidity of steel tubular scaffolding, following conclusions were obtained ： the joints of pulley-clip supporting frame are typical semi-rigid connections, its semi-rigidity is little affected by the different erection distances; the fluctuation of initial connection stiffness of joints is slightly large, when the joint moment is lower than the 20 percent of the control moment; but with over 20 percent of the control moment, the connection stiffness tends towards to be steady; the connection stiffness of the three groups of specimens is equivalent to that of steel tubular scaffolding with tightening torque of 40 N.m, and the stability and erection quality of pulley-clip supporting frame is better than the traditional steel tubular scaffolding.
出处
《工业建筑》
CSCD
北大核心
2012年第10期101-107,共7页
Industrial Construction
基金
教育部人文社科基金资助项目（12YJCZH226）
西安邮电学院中青年基金资助项目（1040403
1040401）
关键词
不完全信息
价格竞争
伯川德悖论
演化博弈
pulley-cllp supporting frame
connection behavior of joints
rigidity
semi-rigid
