战略性经营者激励选择与国际市场份额竞争

The Strategic Choice of Managerial Incentives and International Market Share Rivalry

本文首先用具有线性需求和规模收益不变生产技术的Cournot双头模型来刻画国际市场份额竞争。指出 ,如果参与国际竞争的本国企业是所有权与经营权分离的企业 ,那么 ,无论竞争对手是否是所有权与经营权分离的企业 ,本国企业所有者总是有积极性操纵经营者的激励 ,特别的 ,在只有本国企业作出单边激励选择的情况下 ,这种操纵可以使本国企业生产Stackelberg领先者产量成为可以置信的承诺。它在这里所起到的作用是与出口补贴在战略性贸易政策分析中所起到的作用相一致的。如果考虑到从过去的GATT到现在的WTO都规定政府不得以任何形式参与国际竞争 ,这个结论就更有趣了。因为无须政府帮助 ,本国企业所有者凭借自身的力量就能实现有利于本国企业的竞争结果。这种民间对政府的替代是有意义的。在双边激励选择的情况下 ,两国企业陷入了“囚徒困境”。本国企业只有诉诸于本国政府对国际市场的干预 ,才能重新获得Stackelberg领先者的地位 ;但与对它的传统理解相比 ,这种地位已然弱化。最后 ,我们还证明 ,根据相当一般的条件 ,所有者决定的最优经营者激励只与竞争类型 (数量竞争还是价格竞争 )有关 ,而与企业的产品类型 (替代品还是互补品 )无关。

In this paper,firstly,we represent the international market share rivalry by Cournot duopoly model with linear demand system and CRS technology.We show that,if the ownership and management of the domestic firm separates,then the owner always has incentive to manipulate his (or her) manager's incentive,regardless weather the ownership and management of the foreign firm separates or not.In particular,if domestic firm's owner chooses his (or her) manager's incentive only,this kind of manipulation can make the domestic firm producing Stackelberg leader quantity a credible commitment.The role that it plays here is the same as that of export subsidy in strategic trade policy models.However,the more interesting fact here is that private firm substitutes for government.In the case of bilateral choices of incentives,two firms involve in a “Prisoner's Dilemma”. Only resorting to domestic government's intervention can the domestic firm regain the Stackelberg leadership.However,comparing to the conventional leader follower quantity game,the leadership here is too weak.Secondly,we prove that under relevant conditions,the optimal managerial incentives set by the owners depend on the type of competition (i.e.quantity competition or price competition) only.They do not depend on the type of products (i.e.substitutes or complements).