期刊文献+

我国农民工社会保险制度比较研究 被引量:2

A Comparative Study of the Social Insurance System for Migrant Workers
原文传递
导出
摘要 本文从信息不对称对社会保障的影响开始,通过建立适合于研究农民工特点的最优社会保险机制模型,比较了信息不对称在流动性风险的社会保险制度和不存在流动性风险的保险制度中的表现,着重分析信息不对称对社会保险制度的公平性、社会生产效率和社会保险制度运作效率的影响,从而为农民工社会保险制度建设和政策分析提供理论支持。 This article establishes a optimal social insurance mechanism model, which is suitable for the studying of rural migrant workers' social security, we compare insurance system performance of liquidity-risk's social insurance system with no-liquidity-risk's, which focuses on fairness, social production efficiency and operation efficiency of rural migrant workers' insurance system under information asymmetry. Purpose of the paper is to support building a perfect social insurance system for rural migrant workers and providing policy analysis for studying.
作者 李龙 贾让成
出处 《上海经济研究》 CSSCI 北大核心 2012年第10期95-101,共7页 Shanghai Journal of Economics
基金 2011年浙江省人力资源和社会保障科学研究课题"新生代农民工社会保障问题的博弈分析"阶段性研究成果
关键词 农民工 社会保险 运作效率 最优保险制度 Rural migration workers Social security Operation efficiency Best social security system
  • 相关文献

参考文献11

  • 1Feldstein, M. Social Security, Induced Retirement, and Aggregate Capital Accumulation [ J ]. Journal of Political Economy. 1974(82) , pp. 905 -926.
  • 2Diamond, P.A. and J. A. Mirrlees. A model of social insurance with variable retirement [ J ]. Journal of Public Economics. 1978 (10) , pp. 295 - 336.
  • 3Blomqvist, A. and Horn, H. Public Health Insurance and Optimal Income Taxation[ J]. Journal of Public Econom- ics. 1984 (24), pp. 353-371.
  • 4Rochet, J.C. Incentives, Redistribution and Social Insurance [ J]. Geneva Papers of Risk and Insurance. 1991 (16), oo. 143 -165.
  • 5Cremer, H. and Pestieau, P. Redistributive Taxation and Social Insurance [J]. International Tax and Public Finance. 1996 (3) , pp. 281 -295.
  • 6Petretto, A. , Optimal Social Health Insurance with Supplementary Private Insurance [ J ]. Journal of Health Eco- nomics. 1999 (18), pp. 727-745.
  • 7Boadway, B. and Leite-Monteiro, M. etc. Social Insurance and Redistribution with Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection [ J ]. The Scandinavian Journal of Economics. 2006 (2), pp. 279 - 298.
  • 8Nishimura, Y. , Redistributive taxation and social insurance under adverse selection in the insurance market / J ]. International Tax and Public Finance. 2008(10), pp. 1 -22.
  • 9Breyer, F. , Haufler, A. Health Care Reform: Separating Insurance from Income Redistribution[J]. International Tax and Public Finance. 2000(7) : 445 -461.
  • 10岳公正,阎中兴.养老保险的市场失灵与政府失灵及其矫正路径[J].北方论丛,2005(5):142-145. 被引量:6

二级参考文献17

  • 1斯蒂格利茨 高鸿业等(译).《经济学》[M].中国人民大学出版社,1997..
  • 2.劳动和社会保障部和国家统计局公布《2004年年度劳动和社会保障事业发展统计公报》[Z].,..
  • 3.《北京市“十一五”时期就业和社会保障规划》(初稿)[Z].编制工作领导小组办公室,..
  • 4.北京市海淀区《2004年政府工作报告》[R].,..
  • 5.《海淀统计年鉴》[M].,2004年..
  • 6Akerlof, G, 1970, "The Market for 'Lemons': Quality Uncertainty and the Market Mechanism", Quarterly Journal of Economics, 84(3), pp.488-500.
  • 7Boadway, R, Leite-Monteiro, M, Marchand, M. and P.Pestieau, 2004, "Social Insurance and Redistribution with Moral Hazard and Adverse Selection", CEPR Discussion Paper.
  • 8Cutle, D. M, 2002,"Health Care and the Public Sector",in A. J. Auerbach and M. Feldstein (eds.), Handbook of Public Economics, Vol. 4, Amsterdam: North-Holland, Chapter 31.
  • 9Hindriks, J. and P. De Donder, 2000, "The Polities of Redistributive Social Insurance", CEPR Discussion Paper.
  • 10Rochet, J. C, 1989, "Incentives, Redistribution and Social Insurance", The Geneva Papers of Risk and Insurance, 16,pp.143-165.

共引文献55

同被引文献18

引证文献2

二级引证文献8

相关作者

内容加载中请稍等...

相关机构

内容加载中请稍等...

相关主题

内容加载中请稍等...

浏览历史

内容加载中请稍等...
;
使用帮助 返回顶部