城市湖泊污染治理的博弈分析

The Game Analysis on Pollution of Urban Lakes

从经济学的理论出发,分析了城市湖泊被污染的原因。从城市湖泊公共资源的性质入手,构造了政府与企业之间的完全信息静态博弈模型。分析了决策主体在决策过程中各方互相合作、互相制约的规律,探讨了不同约束条件下导致的不同的博弈均衡结果,进而提出了减少城市湖泊污染的对策建议,为我国在加速推进的工业化城市化进程中保护湖泊水环境提供参考。

The paper analyzed the causes of pollution of the urban lakes in China. Because the urban lake is a kind of common resource, it structured the model of complete information static game between the government and enterprises who pollute the lakes. It analysed the rules of cooperation and restriction of them. It concluded that the different conditions of the initial conditions will lead to the different game equilibriums. So it came up with the suggestion to the policy at present at the end of this paper. It will make a contribution to protect the lake resources from being contaminated during the progress of industrialization of our country.