摘要
构建了一个上游为一个垄断中间投入品生产企业,下游为存在质量差异且进行古诺竞争的双寡头纵向结构,考察纵向结构对下游企业创新激励的影响.研究表明:上游投入品生产企业对下游企业实行歧视性定价,以保证不同产品质量企业存在;在纵向分离结构下,一个下游企业产品质量的提高会降低其竞争企业的创新激励;在纵向一体化结构下,竞争企业质量提高会降低一体化企业的创新激励,而一体化企业质量提高会增加竞争企业的创新激励;与纵向分离结构相比,纵向一体化结构提高一体化企业的创新激励,抑制竞争企业的创新激励.
This paper establishes a vertical structure with an upstream monopoly and two downstream duopolies. Downstream firms compete in quantity and their products are vertically differentiated. Such a model is structured to examine the impact of vertical structures on downstream innovation incentives. This study shows that the upstream monopoly will implement a discrimination price. Quality improvements of downstream firms are reciprocally inhibited under vertical separation. Under vertical integration, the quality improvement of the competitive firm will depress the integrated firm＇s innovating. On the contrary, the quality improvement of the integrated firm will enhance the innovation of the competitive firm. Compared with verti- cal separation, vertical integration accelerates downstream innovation of the integrated firm but decelerates the innovation of the competitive firms.
出处
《系统工程学报》
CSCD
北大核心
2012年第5期626-632,共7页
Journal of Systems Engineering
基金
国家自然科学基金资助项目(71273045
71172150)
教育部人文社会科学基金资助项目(09YJC790034)
中国博士后基金资助项目(20090450113)
中央高校基本科研业务基金资助项目(N090406010)
关键词
纵向差异
古诺竞争
纵向一体化
创新激励
vertical differentiation
Cournot competition
vertical integration
innovation incentives
